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1. Introduction
There is a basic puzzle about lobbying: how can a small special interest group successfully get
an ineﬃcient transfer at the expense of a much larger group with many more resources available
for lobbying? Olson (1982) and others such as Becker (1983) have argued that this is because small
groups are likely to be more eﬀective than large groups but without providing much in the way of a
theory about why this might be the case, and whether there are exceptions. By contrast empirical
results on the relation between group size and strength in this case are mixed, see, for example, the
survey by Potters and Sloof (1996). In this paper we examine a simple model where two groups of
diﬀerent size compete for a prize. The prize to a group takes the form of a transfer from the other
group, and in trying to win the transfer the groups bribe a politician by oﬀering him a payment.
To solve the public good problem of contribution the groups must pay a ﬁxed cost per member.
A formal model of monitoring leading to this result can be found in Levine and Modica (2016).
Here we explore conditions under which a small group is and is not more eﬀective than their larger
rival. Our main ﬁnding is that fungibility - whether the prize can be used to pay for itself - plays
a key role. For example monetary subsidies such as farm subsidies are fungible since they can be
used to pay the politicians who provide the subsidies, while beneﬁts such as civil rights are not
fungible as they do not increase the resources available for lobbying. In the case of a fungible prize
we ﬁnd that the idea that smaller groups are more eﬀective is basically correct. In the case of a
non-fungible prize it is true only up to a point: a group that is too small lacks the resources to
submit a high bid, so that the eﬀectiveness initially increases with group size; but then eventually
decreases.3 In our conclusion we present some evidence that indeed small groups are much more
eﬀective at garnering fungible than non-fungible prizes.
Our model of lobbying is similar to those used in earlier work such as Dixit, Grossman and
Helpman (1997) and Rama and Tabellini (1998) in that we include the possibility that lobbyists
purchase inﬂuence in a menu auction. Those papers consider lobbies that compete with each other
such as trade-unions and business groups and do not analyze the eﬀect of group size. In this work
the general public is represented only indirectly in the form of a preference by government oﬃcials
for eﬃciency. Here we are instead interested speciﬁcally about why a small special interest group
can out lobby a larger general interest group. Why do bankers and farmers win over taxpayers?
We apply the model also to agenda setting, considering that either group can choose the size
of the prize. If the small group can set the agenda we ﬁnd that it will generally choose a relatively
small prize - some subsequent back of the envelope calculations concerning farm subsidies show
that this is plausible. If the large group can set the agenda fungibility plays a key role. In the case
of a fungible prize the large group cannot get the prize. In the case of a non-fungible prize the
large group will choose a very large prize. We also consider the role of the politician. We focus on
3Of course diﬀerent models may deliver diﬀerent predictions. Dixit (2004), Chapter 3 for example considers a
two-period model of bilateral trading where misbehavior by a given individual in the ﬁrst random match can be
punished if her second partner knows that when the second match occurs. Assuming that this information is harder
to come the larger the group yields the result that larger groups are less capable of enforcing fair trade.
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a case where the politician must aﬃliate with one of the lobbies prior to agenda setting. When this
is not the case the politician may blackmail the lobbies by threatening each with the agenda of
the other if they do not pay up. In practice this is probably dangerous, and we show that in some
circumstances it will result in the lobbies colluding to get rid of the politician.
The model potentially provides an explanation of the following paradox: Olson (1965) and
others provide substantial evidence that small groups are eﬀective at winning subsidies while larger
groups are not. However we also observe frequently the suppression of minority rights by a majority;
here the larger group trying to deny rights seems much more eﬀective than the smaller group trying
to keep their rights. We propose that the reason is due to the role of fungibility - small groups are
eﬀective in garnering small prizes regardless of fungibility, while large groups are eﬀective only in
garnering large non-fungible prizes - and civil rights seem to be in that category.
The literature on lobbying and other interest groups is large. Generally these models have
fallen into four categories. Some treat the strength of the group as a black box and proceed with
a working assumption, generally one in which strength decreases with size (Olson (1965), Becker
(1983), Becker (1986)), or in the case of Acemoglu (2001) that strength increases with group size
for a relatively small and a relatively large group.4 A second class of models treats collusive
groups as individuals - eﬀectively ignoring internal incentive constraints - and focuses instead on
information diﬀerences between the groups: examples are Nti (1999), Persson and Tabellini (2002),
Kroszner and Stratman (1998), Laﬀont and Tirole (1991), Austen Smith and Wright (1992), Banks
and Weingast (1992), Damania, Frederiksson and Mani (2004), Green and Laﬀont (1979), Laﬀont
(2000) and Di Porto, Persico and Sahuguent (2013). Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997) is
similar, but allows the endogenous possibility that groups either act non-collusively, or collusively
as a single individual. A few papers assume that leaders of the group can distribute beneﬁts
diﬀerentially (this may or may not be what Olson (1965) has in mind by selective incentives5)
so that there is no public goods problem: see for example Nitzan and Ueda (2011) and Uhlaner
(1989). Finally Pecorino (2009), Lohmann (1998), Esteban and Ray (2001) and Esteban, J. and J.
Sakovics (2003) treat the problem of individual contribution within a group as a voluntary public
goods contribution problem. None of these papers addresses the issue of fungibility. We should
also mention Mitra (1999), that goes in the direction opposite of ours: the paper assumes a ﬁxed
cost of forming a group - in contrast to our conclusion that there is a ﬁxed cost per person in the
group - so the more people there are the easier it is to overcome the ﬁxed cost.
4This is consistent with our results, since we show that strength increases with size for a small group, and for a
relatively large group, the opposition is small, and therefore weak.
5Olson's concept is a bit slippery. He may have in mind people who are not in a group beneﬁting from the
activity of the group - although this view of voluntary group participation runs somewhat counter to his notion of
what constitutes a group. He argues that the group should devise auxiliary services (free lawyers, insurance) which
selectively beneﬁt only group members. It is not entirely clear why it would not be better to free ride on the group
and pay directly for the auxiliary services, unless the group has some cost advantage in providing those services. In
our setting members to not have the option of leaving the group - which is to say that they can not avoid being
punished by group members. For example, farmers cannot avoid being shunned by neighboring farmers by refusing
to join a farm association.
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2. The Model
There are three agents, k ∈ {S,L, P}. The ﬁrst two agents are collusive lobbying groups where
S means small and L means large and the number of members in group k is Nk where NS < NL.
The third agent is a politician.
2.1. The Economic Environment
Transfer payments between the three agents are possible. The status quo is that all agents get
0. Each group k can make a transfer Vk to the other group which receives βVk where 1 > β > 0
is the eﬃciency of the transfer. Any group that is not making a transfer to the other group may
make a payment pk ≥ 0 to the politician.6 In order to make a strictly positive payment to the
politician the group must incur a cost cNk where 1 > c > 0 is a per member cost of organizing and
enforcing the payment from group members. That is, we follow Olson (1965) in recognizing that
the groups face a public good problem and follow Levine and Modica (2016) in assuming that this
can be overcome by a monitoring schemes that has a ﬁxed cost per group member that must be
monitored. Utility is linear in these payments and transfers.
Feasible transfer payments are subject to resource constraints. There are two types of resources:
fungible resources are valued equally by all three groups - they represent money, goods or services.
Non-fungible resources are valued only by the lobbying groups. The represent rights, for example,
the right to bear arms, to have an abortion, to marry, to sit at the front of the bus and so forth.
The politician must receive fungible resources. We consider two diﬀerent economic environments:
the case in which all resources are fungible and the case in which the transfer payments are made
entirely from non-fungible resources. In both cases each group member is endowed with a unit of
fungible resources which can be used to make payments to the politician and for organizing the
group. In the non-fungible case these fungible resources are not used to make transfers and each
group member is also endowed with ν units of resources that can be used only to make transfers.
We limit attention to the case where ν > 1 so that more non-fungible resources are available than
fungible resources.
Speciﬁcally the ﬁrst resource constraint is that the transfer from group k must satisfy Vk ≤ νNk
where we take ν = 1 in the fungible case. Transfer payments to the politician must come from
fungible resources, so in the non-fungible case the payment must satisfy pk ≤ (1 − c)Nk. In the
fungible case the transfers V−k from the other group are fungible and may also used to pay the
politician so the payment must satisfy pk ≤ (1−c)Nk+βV−k. It is useful to use the dummy variable
ψ ∈ {0, 1} to denote whether the environment is fungible or not, where 1 means fungible, so that for
k ∈ {S,L} we may write the resource constraint for paying the politician as pk ≤ (1−c)Nk+ψβV−k.
6Note that if the payment is split among a number of politicians as long as the particular politician in question
receives a ﬁxed share this does not change his incentives.
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2.2. Standard Allocation Mechanisms
We ﬁrst consider what happens when a particular agenda is set in the sense that a proposal
is on the table to transfer a given amount V−a from group −a to the agenda setter group a and
the politician must decide whether or not to implement the proposal. We regard the politician as
a seller who sells his decision (yes or no) to one of the groups - who we regard as buyers - in
exchange for payment. Consider ﬁve standard mechanisms that the politician might use: an all-pay
auction, a second price sealed bid auction, a ﬁrst price sealed bid auction, a menu auction or a
take-it-or-leave-it demand. In an all-pay auction, ﬁrst analyzed by Hillman and Riley (1989), both
groups submit bids, the highest bid wins - so if a wins then the proposal is implemented and if −a
wins it is not - and both groups pay their bid. In a second price sealed bid auction - which is similar
to a ﬁrst price oral auction - both groups submit bids, the highest bid wins, and the winning group
pays the bid of the losing group. In a ﬁrst price sealed bid auction both groups submit bids, the
highest bid wins and the winning bid pays their own bid. In a menu auction each group places a
bid for both winning and losing and pays the winning bid if they win and the losing bid if they lose.
Menu auctions, also known as common agency,7 originally introduced in Bernheim and Whinston
(1986b), are commonly studied mechanisms in the literature on buying inﬂuence such as Grossman
and Helpman (1992)Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997)Grossman and Helpman (2001) or Rama
and Tabellini (1998). With a take-it-or-leave-it demand the politician designates a group to whom
the demand is made and sets a bid and if the group meets that bid they win and pay the bid,
otherwise they lose and pay nothing. So if the politician makes a take-it-or-leave-it demand to
a and the group meets the demand the bid is paid and the proposal is implemented; if it does
not meet the demand neither group pays anything and the proposal is not implemented. If the
take-it-or-leave-it demand is addressed to −a and the group meets the demand the bid is paid and
the proposal is not implemented; if it does not meet the demand neither group pays anything and
the proposal by a is implemented.
It is useful here to contrast lobbying with voting, since lobbying, to a certain extent, is voting
with money. In voting the mechanism is certainly that of the all-pay auction - that is the groups
turn out their voters (their bids) and the highest bid wins. Yet the losing party also has to
bear the cost of turning out their voters despite the fact they do not get the prize. Lobbying
through campaign contributions may have a similar ﬂavor, as campaign contributions may be
made in advance of political favors being granted, and potentially both groups may contribute
to the politicians campaign. However, many payments to politicians are made either ex post or
contemporaneously - for example, jobs after the politician leaves oﬃce, jobs for relatives of the
politician, donations to future campaigns, and of course outright bribes either in the form of cash
or favors. Hence, unlike voting, it makes sense to think of mechanisms where payment is made only
if the favor is delivered as well as the all-pay auction.
7Common agency introduced in Bernheim and Whinston (1986a) is conceptually similar to a menu auction but
assume that bidders are not constrained to make non-negative bids. This model has not been widely used in the
political economy literature and we do not examine it here.
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To analyze these ﬁve mechanisms it is useful to introduce the concept of willingness to pay, as
measured, for example, by a Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1964) elicitation mechanism. Let
Ua = βV−a for the agenda setter and U−a = V−a for the other group denote the respective value of
winning to each group. Let ψa = ψ for the agenda setter and let ψ−a = 0. Then total willingness
to pay of group k is given by
Wk = min{(1− c)Nk + ψkβV−a,max{0, Uk − cNk}} (WTP)
In the case of the agenda setter pursuing a fungible prize this reduces to Wk = max{0, Uk − cNk},
which is decreasing in Nk - the basic Olsonian idea that larger groups are less eﬀective because
they face a stronger public goods problem. In the remaining cases, however, we have Wk =
min{(1− c)Nk,max{0, Uk− cNk}} which for small Nk increases linearly with Nk so that very small
groups are ineﬀective due to their lack of resources for bidding. For these cases there is an optimal
group size neither too big nor too small that maximizes willingness to pay.
Remark. A natural question is why since a smaller group faces a smaller problem (here in terms of
ﬁxed cost) a larger group does not just act like a smaller group in order to increase its willingness
to pay. But a subgroup of sizeMk < Nk would only receive a share of the prize: (Mk/Nk)Uk. Then
the answer is straightforward: the willingness of the subgroup to pay is
min{(1− c)Mk + (Mk/Nk)ψkβVk,max{0, (Mk/Nk)Uk −Mkc}
= (Mk/Nk)min{(1− c)Nk + ψkβVk,max{0, Uk − cNk}
so that the willingness of the subgroup to pay is always a fraction Mk/Nk of the willingness of the
entire group to pay.
We can now characterize equilibrium for each of the ﬁve mechanisms, where we use standard
reﬁnements. Call the group d with the least willingness to pay the disadvantaged group and the
group −d the advantaged group.
Theorem 1. Suppose that Wa > 0. In the all-pay auction there is a unique Nash equilibrium which
is in mixed strategies. The advantaged group plays uniformly on (0,Wd], the disadvantaged group
does not bid with probability (W−d −Wd)/W−d and places the remaining probability uniformly on
(0,Wd]. The expected payment to the politician is
W−d +Wd
2W−d
Wd.
Group −d gets an expected utility of W−d − Wd and group d gets nothing. In the second-price
auction there is a unique equilibrium in which the groups use weakly undominated strategies: both
groups bid their willingness to pay and the expected payment to the politician is Wd and the expected
utility of the two groups is exactly the same as in the all-pay auction. In the ﬁrst price auction and
the menu auction there is a unique truthful equilibrium in which the two groups both bid Wd, the
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advantaged group wins and the expected payment to the politician and the expected utility of both
groups is identical to that in the second price auction. In the take-it-or-leave-it demand case the
politician charges group −d its willingness to pay W−d.
Remark. These are all known results. The all-pay auction is discussed in Hillman and Riley (1989)
and Levine and Mattozi (2016). The take-it-or-leave-it demand and second price auctions are
discussed in most textbooks. For the menu auction, truthfulness as introduced in Bernheim and
Whinston (1986b) requires that a bid of zero be placed for losing. Hence with two alternatives it
is the same as a ﬁrst price auction. Truthfulness further requires that the loser bid their value.
Hence the advantaged group should bid just a bit more than the disadvantaged party and win, and
in the limit should win by placing the same bid.
We should emphasize ﬁrst that the widespread equivalence of the diﬀerent auctions is primarily
because values are commonly known, while most of the auction literature considers the far more
diﬃcult case in which values are private information. Two summarize: the disadvantaged group
never gets anything. Otherwise there are three cases: the take-it-or-leave it demand, the all-pay
auction and the second price, ﬁrst price and menu actions which are all the same. The take-it-or-
leave it demand is best for the politician and worst for the advantaged group. The advantaged group
is indiﬀerent between all the diﬀerent auctions, while the politician dislikes the all-pay auction.
Since everyone agrees or is indiﬀerent to one of the ﬁrst price, second price or menu auctions over
the all-pay auction, we assume that the all pay auction is not used. Since the ﬁrst price, second
price and menu auctions are all the same, for concreteness and simplicity we focus on the second
price auction.
2.3. The Mixed Mechanism
Between the second-price auction and the take-it-or-leave-it demand the politician obviously
does better with the take-it-or-leave-it demand and the advantaged group does better with the
second price auction. How much rent can the politician in fact extract from the two groups? On
the one hand it seems that the politician should be able to extract at least what he can get in a
second-price auction by playing the groups against one another. On the other hand the groups
may resist a take-it-or-leave-it demand that leaves them with no possibility of surplus. In eﬀect the
answer depends upon the bargaining power of the politician. One simple way to capture this idea
in a simple game form is to use a mechanism that randomizes between a second-price auction and
a take-it-or-leave-it demand. That is, we can think of all three agents submitting bids pS , pL, pP ,
with the politician also designating one of the groups as a target τ ∈ {S,L} for his bid. With
probability 1 > α > 0 the game is determined by whether group τ has bid enough to meet the
politician's demand (bid) as with a take-it-or-leave-it demand, while with probability 1 − α the
game is determined by the bids of the two groups as in a second-price auction.
To understand how this mechanism works notice that the amount that either group pays for
winning is independent of its bid. The targeted group faces a randomly drawn price equal to p−τ
with probability 1−α and equal to pP with probability α, wins if its bid pτ is at least equal to the
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randomly drawn price, but pays only the randomly drawn price. If it wins, the proposed transfer
does or does not take place as the targeted group is the agenda setter or not. If τ loses the opposite
happens: the agenda is implemented iﬀ τ = −a. In this case if τ loses to the politician the agenda
setter obtains the transfer for free. Note that here losing must mean the opponent wins which
is why when the non-agenda setter is targeted and loses the take-it-or-leave it auction the agenda
setter must get the transfer for free.
In the case of the non-targeted group with probability α its bid does not matter, although it
may get its preferred policy implemented for free if the targeted group falls short in the bidding
against the politician. With probability 1− α it wins if and only if its own bid pτ ≥ p−τ - that is,
it faces a second-price auction.
Since - regardless of whether a group is targeted or not - the amount that it pays for winning is
independent of its bid, it is weakly dominant for both groups to bid their willingness-to-pay. Given
that, the only possible equilibrium play of the politician is to target the advantaged group τ = −d
and to bid pP =W−d.
3. Agenda Setting
Transfers are determined by bargaining between the three agents. Speciﬁcally we consider the
following game-form:
1. The politician chooses a group a ∈ {S,L} to aﬃliate with. The group chosen is called the
agenda setter.
2. The agenda setter may opt out and the status quo remains, or may propose an agenda for
the amount of transfer 0 ≤ V−a ≤ νN−a to be paid by the other group.
3. All three agents submit bids pk. The politician designates a target group τ ∈ {a,−a}
for his bid. The bids should satisfy 0 ≤ p−a ≤ (1 − c)N−a, 0 ≤ pa ≤ (1 − c)Na + ψβV−a and
0 ≤ pP ≤ (1− c)Nτ + ψτβV−τ .
4. If the two groups bid zero the status quo remains. Otherwise, with probability α the price
to be paid to the politician is his bid pP and with probability 1− α it is the lowest bid. When the
price is the bid of the politician τ wins and pays pP if and only if his bid is at least that of the
politician: pτ ≥ pP ; otherwise the politician is not paid and group −τ wins. When the price is the
lowest bid the highest bidder wins, and in case of a tie the agenda setter wins; in both cases the
politician is paid the price by the winner.
5. If the non-agenda setter wins the status quo remains. If agenda setter wins the transfer is
made.
The notion of equilibrium is subgame perfect equilibrium with three mild reﬁnements: (1) no
player plays a weakly dominated strategy, (2) if the agenda setter is indiﬀerent to submitting a
bid she does not do so, and (3) if the politician is indiﬀerent between targeting the two groups she
targets the agenda setter. The ﬁrst assumption is self-explanatory and leads to the groups bidding
their value. The second can be viewed as a lexicographic preference for not bidding that arises
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from a small cost of preparing a bid. The third can be viewed as a mild ability of the politician to
commit to the group to which she aﬃliates.
3.1. Agenda Setting Equilibrium
We say that the agenda setter a has a winning agenda if there is a feasible choice V−a ≤ νN−a
for which the agenda setter bid/willingness to pay is greater than that of the non-agenda setter
Wa > W−a. The optimal agenda is a winning agenda for which the diﬀerence in willingness to pay
is the greatest, since the net utility of the agenda setter is increasing in that diﬀerence and equal
to (1−α)(Wa−W−a). Notice that in case of equal willingness to pay the agenda setter earns zero,
so will choose to opt out. In Appendix 1 we prove
Theorem 2. If the large group has a winning agenda the optimal agenda is νNS; if the small group
has a winning agenda its optimal agenda is cNL.
In the fungible case: if β ≤ NS/NL both groups opt out; otherwise the politician aﬃliates with
the small group.
In the non-fungible case: when βν > (1 − c) + cNL/NS the politician aﬃliates with the large
group; when νNS/NL < βν ≤ (1 − c) + cNL/NS the politician aﬃliates with the small group; and
otherwise both groups opt out. The bids are given in the following table:
Table 1: Equilibrium Bids/Willingness to Pay
Fungible case, small
group sets agenda cNL
Bid by S c(βNL −NS) > 0
Bid by L 0
Non-fungible
case
small group sets agenda cNL large group sets agenda νNS
Bid by S min{(1− c)NS , βcNL − cNS} > 0 (ν − c)NS > 0
Bid by L 0 min{(1− c)NL, βνNS − cNL} > 0
If the transfer is too ineﬃcient (β small) the status quo is maintained. The overall message is
that fungible issues or low stakes (ν small) favor the small group while non-fungible issues with
high stakes favor the large group. When it wins the small group is not too greedy in the sense
that it asks only for cNL while it could ask for as much as NL; by contrast the large group, unlike
the small group, when it wins asks the most it can possibly get. Moreover, amount that the small
group wins cNL is increasing in the ﬁxed cost c. Notice too that only relative group size matters,
the absolute size of groups is irrelevant. 8
8The reader may notice that the result also implies that holding all else ﬁxed in the non-fungible case, if the small
group is small enough relative to the large group it will win. This may seem to go against the main theme of the
paper, but remember we consider only two groups and take group sizes as given. We cannot say, therefore, that it
would not be advantageous for several groups to join forces. Moreover, if the cost of forming a group is non-null, as
in Mitra (1999), the groups we actually observe cannot be too small.
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4. Blackmail
We have assumed that the politician aﬃliates with one group before bids are submitted. But
since the aﬃliation is valuable to the groups, why do they not oﬀer to pay the politician to aﬃliate
with them? Or to put it diﬀerently - why does not the politician accept bids from both groups
then decide with whom to aﬃliate. Intuition suggests that this may be lucrative for the politician:
by telling each group if you do not give me a good bid I will pass the other group's agenda and
you will be really sorry each group will be willing to pay a great deal. On the other hand since
groups may wind up paying more than the agenda is worth to them - the value to themselves plus
the value to the other group - engaging in this type of political blackmail may be dangerous for
the politician: the groups do not much like this and may collude to get rid of the politician. Here
we consider a simple model that allows for the possibility both of blackmail and of removal of the
politician.
We now elaborate the lobbying game form as follows:
1. The politician either chooses a group a ∈ {S,L} to aﬃliate with (called as before the agenda
setter) or he does not - in which case we say he chooses to be opportunistic.
2. Each group chooses either to attempt removal of the politician, to block removal of the
politician or to remain neutral. To attempt removal or block removal incurs a small cost which we
model as a lexicographic preference for remaining neutral in case of indiﬀerence.
3. If one group attempts removal of the politician and the other group does not block it the
politician is removed, and everyone gets 0. Otherwise the game continues.
In case the politician is not removed the game continues:
4. If the politician has aﬃliated with a group the agenda setting game of the previous section
is played.
5. If the politician has chosen to be opportunistic each group k ∈ {S,L} proposes an agenda
consisting of a transfer 0 ≤ V−k ≤ νN−k to be paid for by the other group and submits a bid
0 ≤ pk ≤ (1 − c)Nk + ψβV−k. The politician designates a target group τ and submits a bid
0 ≤ pP ≤ (1− c)Nτ + ψβνN−τ .
6. If both groups bid zero the status quo remains. Otherwise, with probability α the price is
the bid of the politician and with probability 1− α it is the lowest bid. When the price is the bid
of the politician τ wins if pτ ≥ pP ; if pτ < pP politician is not paid and −τ wins. When the price
is the lowest bid the highest bidder wins and in case of a tie the target group wins.
7. The winning group has their agenda implemented and pays the price.
The notion of equilibrium is that in each subgame we must have Nash equilibrium in weakly
undominated strategies. We use two additional reﬁnements in addition to the lexicographic tie-
breaking rule about removing the politician already mentioned. The ﬁrst has to do with bids. In
the blackmail subgame demands and bids are submitted simultaneously. This means that weak
dominance has no bite. Recall that in a second-price auction there are many equilibria. For
example: the loser might bid zero and the winner bid the loser's willingness to pay - in which
case the winner gets the item for free. This is ordinarily ruled out through weak dominance. We
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cannot do so in the blackmail game, so we instead assume that the equilibrium must be robust to
a small probability of the other bid being random which we model as assuming that conditional
on the equilibrium demand of the other group and the own demand each group does in fact bid
their willingness to pay and the politician targets the group with the highest willingness to pay
and bids that amount. Second, the loser of the auction is indiﬀerent to the demand. This raises
an issue similar to that in bidding: there are many equilibria some in which the loser demands
little and some in which the loser bids much. This is not reasonable if there is a small chance that
your demand - perhaps being recognized as being just by the political system - will be accepted.
In that case when indiﬀerent you should also make the highest possible demand in case it should
be accepted. So as an additional reﬁnement we assume that when indiﬀerent the highest demand
must always be made. These reﬁnements lead to a unique outcome.
Note incidentally that we assume that the politician does not submit his bid after the demands
are known, which would put the winner in the position of a Stackelberg leader being able to
shave his demand to pay less to the politician. The politician has incentive to commit to his bid
simultaneously to avoid this.
One issue: why not assume that the game is sequential move? That is, ﬁrst demands are
submitted then observing the demand of the other group bids are submitted. However, from a
descriptive point of view it seems to us most likely that given the politician is taking bids, the groups
say here is what I want and here is what I will pay rather than here is what I want, and we'll
argue later over what I'll pay. Second, as we will see, in the simultaneous move game the politician
gets the most possible in any extensive form, hence has no reason to prefer a diﬀerent mechanism.
We should also acknowledge that with the reﬁnements described above the simultaneous move game
is much easier to analyze than the sequential move game.
4.1. Blackmail Equilibrium
In Appendix 2 we prove
Theorem 3. The only cases in which the politician chooses to be opportunistic are in the non-
fungible case if
βν > (1− c) + cNL
NS
+ α(1− c)[NL
NS
− 1]
in which case the large group wins; and in the fungible case if β > 1− c and
(1− α) [β − (1− c)] [NL
NS
− 1] > 1
in which case the small group wins. When the politician is opportunistic each group proposes the
maximum possible V−k = νN−k and bids the maximum possible (1 − c)Nk + ψβνN−k. In the
remaining cases the politician aﬃliates with a group and the result is as in Theorem 2.
Overall the result is not terribly diﬀerent than the main result - with non-fungible prizes favoring
the large group and fungible prizes favoring the small group. It is interesting in the non-fungible
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case to contrast the condition for blackmail and the large group winning
βν > (1− c) + cNL
NS
+ α(1− c)[NL
NS
− 1]
with the condition for the large group winning when there is no blackmail
βν > (1− c) + cNL
NS
.
We see that the former condition always implies the latter, so that the possibility of blackmail
does not additionally favor the large group, but rather when the stakes βν are moderate the large
group wins and is not blackmailed, but when the stakes are large enough the politician will turn to
blackmail. The less eﬀective is the politician at bargaining (the smaller is α) the lower the stakes
for which the politician will turn to blackmail. Put diﬀerently, blackmail by the politician enables
him to attain a greater share if he is an ineﬀectual bargainer - but since he cannot commit to a
modest demand, blackmail is only useful if he is unable to make a large demand. Basically the
same circumstances which favor the large group are also likely to lead to blackmail.
By contrast blackmail is not so likely over fungible issues. If β < 1 − c it will never occur.
Otherwise it is large values of NL/NS which both favor the small group without blackmail and are
likely to lead to blackmail.
5. Discussion
The model has several implications. First, fungible prizes are more favorable to small groups
than non-fungible prizes. Second, a small group should not be too greedy in agenda setting. Third,
a higher ﬁxed cost is more favorable to the small group. The world is a complicated place with
many issues and in addition to lobbying where there are ﬁxed costs that favor smaller groups,
political decisions are also inﬂuenced by voting which as Levine and Mattozi (2016) show is more
favorable to large groups. Moreover many political decisions are made by courts, and while these
decisions are inﬂuenced by political calculations and lobbying the mechanism does not match that
described in our model. Never-the-less it is useful to ask whether the complicated world reﬂects in
a broad sense the general implications of the model. Some rough back-of-the-envelope calculations
show that there is promise in this direction.
One place to look is to see how political decisions reﬂect public opinion. Do decisions favoring
a group have substantial public support or limited public support? The model suggests that for
fungible prizes widespread public support is not so important while for non-fungible prizes it is.
Two signiﬁcant non-fungible issues have been civil rights for blacks and civil rights for gays. In
both cases signiﬁcant advances have occurred when public support has become widespread.
Long term polling by Gallup9 asks about willingness to vote for a black person for President,
9www.gallup.com/poll/3400/longterm-gallup-poll-trends-portrait-american-public-opinion.aspx
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which may be taken as an indicator of general attitudes towards civil rights. In 1958 only 38%
responded positively, By 1959 this rose to about 50% where it remained until about 1963 when it
rose to 60%, dipped brieﬂy in 1967 and then rose steadily to about 95% by the year 2000. Civil
rights have been largely reﬂective of these public attitudes towards blacks. The separate but equal
doctrine permitting racial discrimination in a variety of domains, but most signiﬁcantly education
was established in 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson, and although it was repudiated in law in 1954 in
Brown v. Board of Education, desegregation was not immediately implemented: George Wallace's
stand in the school house door taking place in 1963 - well after turn of public opinion, and the
landmark legislation was the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Political action occurred only when the size
of the group supporting civil rights became large. We ﬁnd a similar story with respect to gay civil
rights. The Pew Research center ﬁnds that in 2003 only 32% of Americans favored same-sex legal
marriage - this increased steadily, reaching parity by 2011.10 From 1975 to 2000 various states and
the Federal government passed a series of laws banning gay marriage. By 2009 only seven states
had recognized gay marriage. This rose to thirteen by 2013 and to ﬁfty with the Supreme court
decision in 2015. Again the recognition of rights - non-fungible as it is - seems to have followed
public opinion and indeed, majority public opinion.
By contrast if we look at an important fungible issue - farm subsidies - we see that support
for large farms which receive the bulk of subsidies has only 15% popular support.11 While there
are only about 2 million farms in the US it is not just farmers that beneﬁt from farm subsidies.
An upper bound should be the rural population of the US of about 60 million people or roughly
20 million households out of the 120 million U.S. households - which is also about 15%. So we
see that a minority of roughly 15% is eﬀective at getting a fungible prize from the remaining 85%.
This number 15% is similar to the fraction of the population that is either black or gay - yet those
groups have been ineﬀectual in realizing the non-fungible prize of civil rights until they achieved
the support of roughly a majority.
Another way to get a handle on the eﬀectiveness of small groups in competing for fungible prizes
to to look at how many of them there are. For example, the Italian yellow pages for example list
21,788 associations sindacali e di categoria. These groups - largely trade unions - have two main
functions: they negotiate with ﬁrms over contracts and they lobby government for favors. If we
look at the geographical distribution of these groups we can get an idea of the relative importance
of these two functions. In Rome there are almost 1500 groups, in Milan around 1000 and in Bologna
about 400. Looking at GDP, we see that Lombardia (the region of Milan) produces twice that of
Lazio (where Rome is), and Emilia Romagna (containing Bologna) 20% less than Lazio.12 Why
then does Lazio have 50% more groups than Lombardia despite having half the GDP and four
times the number of groups as Emilia despite having similar GDP? It is natural to think that the
reason is that Lazio contains Rome where Italian governmental functions are centralized. So it
10pewforum.org/2015/07/29/graphics-slideshow-changing-attitudes-on-gay-marriage
11www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brunitedstatescanadara/602.php
12Source ISTAT. Figures for 2014 in millions of Euros are: Lazio 166, Lombardia 313, Emilia 130.
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seems that perhaps as many as 1000 of these groups are primarily lobbying for fungible beneﬁts
from the Italian government and bureaucracy. Needless to say this is a large number of lobbying
groups and all represent a relatively small number of people. In a similar vein we notice that in
the U.S. there are around 10,000 registered lobbyists.13
It is the presence of a ﬁxed cost per member that prevents a large group from being eﬀective.
But is the level of ﬁxed cost needed to explain the data plausible? Since data are readily available
let us examine farm subsidies in the U.S.14 As we observed, NL is about 85% and NS is about 15%
of households, so that NL is indeed much larger than NS . From the U.S. budget farm subsidies run
about $20 billion per year, or, with 100 million non-farm households about $200 per household.
Now when the small group wins (taking the base model for reference) we have VL = cNL, whence
c = VL/NL = $200. To put this in perhaps more meaningful units, we observe that annual per
capita income in the U.S. is about $50,000 per year and the labor force is about half the population,
so that income per worker is about $100,000. Hours worked per worker per year are about 1700,
meaning that the hourly income per worker is about $60. So $200 per household translates into an
opportunity cost per person for participating in a group of roughly half a working day per year.
This seems a plausible number.
The model also has a more reﬁned implication that the amount of the beneﬁt accruing to
politicians in the form of bribes depends on α. If politicians have little bargaining power then α
is small and they get little. If they have a lot of bargaining power the should be able to get (in
the case of farm subsidies) nearly $20 billion per year. There are several ways of getting ballpark
numbers about the size of bribes. Here is one piece of evidence
The net worth of the 70 richest delegates in China's National People's Congress, which
opens its annual session on March 5, rose to 565.8 billion yuan ($89.8 billion) in 2011,
a gain of $11.5 billion from 2010, according to ﬁgures from the Hurun Report, which
tracks the country's wealthy. That compares to the $7.5 billion net worth of all 660 top
oﬃcials in the three branches of the U.S. government. 15
One estimate of the annual value of bribes received by top Chinese oﬃcials is the increase in their
wealth - $11.5 billion. China currently is of similar size in total real GDP as the U.S. Suppose that
the portion of the economy subject to discretionary transfers in China is similar in size to the U.S.
agricultural sector. Then $11.5 billion in bribes is consistent with the idea that U.S. agricultural
subsidies are commensurate with the overall size of favors paid by government oﬃcials - this would
imply a substantial α although - since there are sectors other than agriculture - considerably less
than 50%. By contrast, if we assume that wealth among top U.S. oﬃcials increased as much as
that of Chinese oﬃcials, after accounting for the fact that U.S. oﬃcial are much less wealthy, we
estimate the value of bribes by top U.S. government oﬃcials at about $1 billion. If we look at
13https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
14This data can be conveniently found in the St. Louis Fed FRED.
15Bloomberg News, February 26, 2012: China's Billionaire People's Congress Makes Capitol Hill Look Like Pauper.
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direct payments to U.S. politicians in the form of campaign contributions we ﬁnd from Floating
Path (2012) that about $1 billion is contributed to presidential campaigns. Since these take place
every four years, but there are also congressional, state and local elections which are less costly but
more frequent, we can take this also as a ballpark estimate of the value of bribes accruing to U.S.
politicians. This suggests that in the U.S. α is quite small, less than 5%.
Turning to the bigger picture: the theory suggests that cost of ineﬃciency (1− β)cNL depends
on fundamentals and not on bargaining power α which simply determines how much politicians
walk away with. Seen this way, while the evidence is in favor of a much higher α in China than
in the U.S. - the theory says that from an allocational point of view - the amount of ineﬃcient
transfers - it may not make much diﬀerence. Notice, by the way, the fact that α is clearly much
higher in China than the U.S. is suggestive that in societies that are more extractive in the sense
of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) politicians have more bargaining power.
Finally, the reason that lobbyists should not be too greedy is to avoid provoking the larger group
into paying the ﬁxed cost. We have seen this happen - for example, in the case of Stop Online
Piracy Act (SOPA) in the U.S. This was an eﬀort by copyright lobbyists to use Federal power to
enforce their copyright claims. It had 31 sponsors in the U.S. House of Representatives. It was
also an overreach. A large number of groups, including both technology ﬁrms and most notably
Wikipedia launched a lobbying campaign against the bill. Despite the 31 sponsors the bill then
died in committee and never came to the ﬂoor of the House.
Going back to Mancur Olson: his original idea that small groups are stronger does not take
account of the fact that groups face budget constraints. These constraints vary considerably de-
pending on whether the transfer groups seek is fungible or not - and this has a big impact on group
behavior. When the prize is fungible small groups have a signiﬁcant advantage over large ones as
Olson suggests. When the prize is not fungible larger groups are advantaged provided they can
extract enough value from the small group. This may explain the apparent paradox that when
it comes to special ﬁnancial favors small groups seem very eﬀective, but when it comes to large
non-ﬁnancial issues - such as minority rights - large groups are more eﬀective.
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Appendix 1: Proof of the Main Theorem
Theorem. [Theorem 2 in the text] If the large group has a winning agenda the optimal agenda is
νNS; if the small group has a winning agenda its optimal agenda is cNL.
In the fungible case: if β ≤ NS/NL both groups opt out; otherwise the politician aﬃliates with
the small group.
In the non-fungible case: when βν > (1 − c) + cNL/NS the politician aﬃliates with the large
group; when νNS/NL < βν ≤ (1 − c) + cNL/NS the politician aﬃliates with the small group; and
otherwise both groups opt out. The bids are given in the following table:
Table 2: Equilibrium Bids/Willingness to Pay
Fungible case, small
group sets agenda cNL
Bid by S c(βNL −NS) > 0
Bid by L 0
Non-fungible
case
small group sets agenda cNL large group sets agenda νNS
Bid by S min{(1− c)NS , βcNL − cNS} > 0 (ν − c)NS > 0
Bid by L 0 min{(1− c)NL, βνNS − cNL} > 0
Proof. We study optimal agendas and the politician's choice. Instead of willingness to pay which
involves constraints based on the size of the group, whether the group is an agenda setter, and the
fungibility of the prize, it is useful to ignore the constraints and consider the desire to pay. For
the agenda setter a this is βV−a − cNa and for the non-agenda setter this is V−a − cN−a. Both
are increasing in V−a but the desire of the non-agenda setter increases more rapidly. Deﬁne the
crossover point Vˆ−a ≡ c(N−a −Na)/(1 − β) as the point where the two desires are equal. To the
right of this point the non-agenda setter has a higher desire. This means that if the constraints
on his ability to pay do not bind he is at least as willing to pay as the agenda-setter. To the left
of the crossover point the same is true of the agenda setter. We can also deﬁne the payoﬀ point
V˜−a ≡ cNa/β as the point where the desire of the agenda setter is zero. To the right of this point
the agenda setter may possibly wish to set an agenda, to the left of this point never.
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We ﬁrst analyze the right of the crossover point, that is, V−a > Vˆ−a. Here there is a winning
agenda only if the constraint binds on the non-agenda setter, that is W−a = (1− c)N−a. Moreover
since the bid of the non-agenda setter cannot increase once the constraint binds the agenda setter
should propose the highest possible agenda, that is V−a = νN−a. For this to be a winning bid the
willingness of the agenda setter to pay must be strictly greater than (1− c)N−a which is impossible
for a = S in the non-fungible case and otherwise true if and only if βνN−a − cNa > (1 − c)N−a
which is equivalent to βν > (1− c) + cNa/N−a.
In case a = L the crossover point Vˆ−a < 0 and so the large group has a winning agenda if and
only if βν > (1− c) + cNL/NS . Note that in the fungible case this is impossible.
In the case of the small group the crossover point is positive, so we must analyze the left of the
crossover point. The small group will not propose any agenda below the payoﬀ point V˜L = cNS/β.
There are two cases depending on which of VˆLor V˜L is larger. Notice that VˆL ≤ V˜L may be written
as β ≤ NS/NL.
If VˆL ≤ V˜L then there is no winning agenda for the small group below the crossover point, so
the small group is in the same boat as the large group: it has a winning agenda if and only if the
transfer is fungible β > (1 − c) + cNS/NL. However this is inconsistent with β ≤ NS/NL so the
small group has no winning agenda.
For β ≤ NS/NL we now have the complete picture. In the non-fungible case the small group has
no winning agenda, and the large group has a winning agenda if and only if βν > (1−c)+cNL/NS .
Hence either βν ≤ (1 − c) + cNL/NS and no agenda is submitted, or βν > (1 − c) + cNL/NS in
which case the large group submits the winning agenda VS = νNS . In the fungible case neither
group has a winning agenda.
We now analyze the remaining case a = S for β > NS/NL that is V˜L < VˆL. If the highest
feasible bid lies below V˜L that νNL ≤ V˜L = cNS/β, or equivalently, βν ≤ cNS/NL then there
is no winning agenda to propose. Otherwise to small group is willing to propose an agenda to
the right of the payoﬀ point. Observe that the large group bids zero if and only if VL ≤ cNL
and note that cNL > V˜L = βcNS . So there there is no point in proposing an agenda less than
cNL = min{cNL, νNL}. Since c < ν so that larger agendas are feasible then the willingness to pay of
the large group rises faster than the small group as long as the large group is not constrained. Hence
either the small group should propose cNL or should propose enough that the constraint binds, in
which case it is optimal to propose νNL. However, in the non-fungible case if the constraint binds
on the large group then the small group cannot win the bidding. In the fungible case proposing
cNL gives WS −WL = βcNL− cNS and proposing νNL gives WS −WL ≤ βNL− cNS − (1− c)NL.
It can be checked the the former is always larger than the latter, so that in all cases the optimal
winning agenda for the small group is cNL.
That covers the fungible case as we already know that the large group has no winning agenda in
that case. In the non-fungible case if βν ≤ (1−c)+cNL/NS the large group has no winning agenda
so the politician aﬃliates with the small group provided βν > cNS/NL so that the small group has
a winning agenda. Otherwise the large group will propose the agenda VS = νNS resulting in the
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politician receiving (1−α)(1−c)NS+αmin{βνNS−cNL, (1−c)NL} ≥ (1−c)NS while the agenda
of the small group of VL = cNL gives the politician αmin{βcNL −NSc,NS(1− c)} ≤ αNS(1− c).
This implies that the large group agenda is strictly preferred by the politician.
Appendix 2: Proof of the Blackmail Theorem
Theorem. [Theorem 3 in the text] The only cases in which the politician chooses to be opportunistic
are in the non-fungible case if
βν > (1− c) + cNL
NS
+ α(1− c)[NL
NS
− 1]
in which case the large group wins; and in the fungible case if β > 1− c and
(1− α) [β − (1− c)] [NL
NS
− 1] > 1
in which case the small group wins. When the politician is opportunistic each group proposes
the maximum possible V−k = νN−k and bid the maximum possible (1 − c)Nk + ψβνN−k. In the
remaining cases the politician aﬃliates with a group and the result is as in Theorem 2.
We prove this through a series of lemmas.
Lemma 1. If the politician is opportunistic both groups propose the maximum possible, that is
group k demands V−k = νN−k
Proof. The game is simultaneous move. Given the bidding/demand strategy of the other group
and the own bid utility is weakly increasing in the demand that is made. That is, because the game
is simultaneous move a higher demand has no eﬀect on the bids or demands of the other group, so
you might as well ask for as much as you can. In case of indiﬀerence we have assumed you propose
the maximum possible.
Corollary 1. The losing group strictly prefers the status quo to a opportunistic politician.
Proof. Since the losing group gets −νN−k if the politician is opportunistic and zero at the status
quo.
Lemma 2. If the politician is opportunistic both groups in equilibrium bid the maximum possible,
that is, group k bids (1− c)Nk + ψβνN−k where recall that ψ reﬂects whether the prize is fungible
or not.
Proof. Since we have assumed both groups bid their willingness to pay given the proposals, and we
know the equilibrium proposals from Lemma 1, this is just a matter of showing that the maximum
possible bid (1− c)Nk+ψβνN−k is less than or equal to the desire to pay νβN−k− cNk+ νNk, or,
rearranging that inequality (1− ν)Nk ≤ (1− ψ)νβN−k. Since by assumption ν ≥ 1 this inequality
must hold.
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Non-fungible case.
Lemma 3. In the non-fungible case the opportunistic politician remains in oﬃce if and only if
βν ≥ (1− c) + cNL
NS
+ α(1− c)[NL
NS
− 1]
in which case the large group wins. The politician chooses opportunism if he is able to remain in
oﬃce.
Proof. The large group equilibrium bid is (1−c)NL and the small group equilibrium bid is (1−c)NS
so the winner is the large group who pays (1 − α)(1 − c)NS + α(1 − c)NL and gets βνNS − cNL.
Hence the net utility of winning for the large group is βνNS−cNL−(1−c)[(1−α)NS+αNL]. When
this is strictly negative the politician is removed the small group being indiﬀerent. The condition
for the politician to remain in oﬃce is therefore that this be non-negative, which may be rewritten
as
βν ≥ cNL
NS
+ (1− c)(1− α+ αNL
NS
) = (1− c) + cNL
NS
+ α(1− c)[NL
NS
− 1].
Finally, if he is opportunistic and not removed the politician gets (1 − c)[(1 − α)NS + αNL];
if not, in the range of βν above he aﬃliates with the large group and gets (see last paragraph of
the proof of Theorem 2) (1− α)(1− c)NS + αmin{βνNS − cNL, (1− c)NL} which is less or equal
than what he gets if opportunistic. Hence he will choose to be opportunistic if he is not removed
by doing so.
Lemma 4. In the fungible case the opportunistic politician remains in oﬃce if and only if β > 1−c
and
(1− α)[β − (1− c)](NL −NS)−NS > 0
in which case the small group wins. The politician chooses opportunism if he is able to remain in
oﬃce.
Proof. In the fungible case recall that ν = 1 so that the large group equilibrium bid is (1− c)NL+
βNS and the small group equilibrium bid is (1− c)NS + βNL. The condition that the small group
equilibrium bid is larger is 1− c− β < 0 or β > 1− c. There are three cases.
Case β > 1 − c: the small group wins, getting βNL − cNS and paying α [(1− c)NS + βNL] +
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(1− α) [(1− c)NL + βNS ]. This gives a net utility of
βNL − cNS − α[βNL + (1− c)NS ]− (1− α)[(1− c)NL + βNS ]
= [β − αβ − (1− α)(1− c)]NL − [c+ α(1− c) + (1− α)β]NS
= (1− α)[β − (1− c)]NL − [1− (1− c) + α(1− c) + (1− α)β]NS
= (1− α)[β − (1− c)]NL − [1− (1− α)(1− c) + (1− α)β]NS
= (1− α)[β − (1− c)](NL −NS)−NS
The leader is not removed when this expression is non-negative. As can be seen by inspection this
happens if: α is small, β is large and NL/NS is large.
Case β < 1− c: the large group wins. The net utility of the large group in this case is
βNS − cNL − α[βNS + (1− c)NL]− (1− α)[(1− c)NS + βNL]
= (1− α)βNS − cNL − α(1− c)NL − (1− α)(1− c)NS − (1− α)βNL
= (1− α)[β − (1− c)]NS − [c+ α(1− c) + (1− α)β]NL
< (1− α)[β − (1− c)]NS < 0
last inequality from β < 1 − c. Consequently in this case the politician always prefers to aﬃliate
with a group.
Case β = 1 − c. In this case whoever wins (the targeted group) has negative utility. Indeed if
the small group wins it gets
βNL − cNS − (1− c)(NS +NL)
= (1− c)NL − cNS − (1− c)(NS +NL) = −NS
analogously for the large group. Politician will therefore not choose to be opportunistic in this case.
Finally we observe that if the politician is opportunistic and not removed he gets α [(1− c)NS + βNL]+
(1−α) [(1− c)NL + βNS ] while if he is not he aﬃliates with small group and gets αc(βNL−NS) <
α(βNL −NS) < α [(1− c)NS + βNL] he prefers to be opportunistic if he can get away with it.
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